Inequality and Production Elasticity by Goren, Amir
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Inequality and Production Elasticity
Amir Goren
University of California - Irvine
22 July 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80316/
MPRA Paper No. 80316, posted 26 July 2017 16:10 UTC
Inequality and Production Elasticity
Amir Goren
Abstract
We address a contention regarding capital deepening when the labor share of in-
come declines and the elasticity of substitution is above unity between Karabarbou-
nis and Neiman (2013) and Elsby et. al (2013). We demonstrate the incentive for
technical change, which increases inequality and how investments in new technol-
ogy create temporal misalignment between a decrease in the labor share of income
and capital deepening. We show how the decline in the saving rate that occurred
during the 80’s and 90’s may resolve the contention regarding capital deepening.
We find that elasticity of substitution below unity is less consistent with the decline
in the labor share of income.
A second contention is whether the elasticity of substitution is above or below
unity. We perform a time-varying state-space estimation of the evolution of elastic-
ity using the unadjusted marginal product of labor and the Kalman Filter. We find
that the elasticity between capital and labor has been fluctuating slightly above
unity since 1980, which is consistent with our theoretical findings. We note that
an elasticity of substitution above unity has important implications for balanced
growth under capital augmentation.
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1 Introduction
“To determine the laws which regulate this (income) distribution is the prin-
cipal problem in Political Economy” (Ricardo 1891 in reference to the distri-
bution of income between land, capital and labor).
The census family income data, as compiled by CBPP (2015), suggest
that since the late 70’s the share of income gains between rich and poor
have been diverging. This paper is focused on the determinants of income
distribution between capital and labor since “wages make a small fraction
of very top incomes, and trends in wage inequality can only explain a small
fraction of the trends in very top income shares” (Piketty and Saez 2001).
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Source: Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) note that global labor share of income
has significantly declined since the early 1980s, with the decline occurring
within the large majority of countries and industries. They further find that
a reduction in the cost of investment goods relative to consumption goods
explains half of the decrease in the labor share of income. Another key find-
ing by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) is that under a CES production
function the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 1.25, sig-
nificantly above unity.
Two contentions arise from Karabarbounis and Neiman’s (2013) that the
current paper aims to address. The first contention is in regards to capital
deepening and the second is in regards to whether the elasticity of substitu-
tion is above or below unity.
1.1 First Contention - Capital Deepening
Elsby et. al (2013) show that when the elasticity of substitution is above
unity, a decrease in the labor share implies capital deepening. Such cap-
ital deepening did not occur and, therefore, they discount Karabarbounis
and Neiman’s findings and suggest, instead, that competition from import
is responsible for the decline in the share of labor. However, Autor et. al
(2017) note that the labor share has also declined in most non-traded sec-
tors such as wholesale, retail and utilities, a pattern not readily explained
by rising trade. They provide an explanation of “winner takes most” “super-
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star firms” that are disproportionally responsible for the decline in the labor
share. However, their explanation does not solve the contention regarding
the lack of capital deepening. Lawrence (2015) provides evidence that in the
United States the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less
than unity. Lawrence claims that given this low elasticity the cause of the
decline in labor’s share of income is the weakness of investment in the face
of faster labor-augmenting technical change rather than more capital deep-
ening. However, Koh et. al (2016) show that intellectual property products
(IPP) entirely account for the observed decline of the US labor share. They
also find that the elasticity of substitution implied from the most updated
data that contains IPP capital (and income) is 1.866.
We use a Solow model with a representative firm that owns the capital
and is controlled by the capitalists to demonstrate how investments in new
technology together with the decline in the saving rate that occurred during
the 80’s and 90’s resolve this contention and explain a decline in the labor
share of income with no capital deepening.
1.2 Second Contention - Elasticity Above Unity
The first contention regarding capital deepening is centered around Karabar-
bounis and Neiman’s (2013) estimate of elasticity of substitution above unity,
which differs from most previous estimates of elasticity of substitution below
unity.
The second contention is therefore whether the elasticity of substitution
is above or below unity. We hypothesize that the inconsistency of elasticity
estimates in the literature signify that the elasticity of substitution is an
evolving parameter of the production technology.
Previous elasticity estimates were derived by linear regression, which pro-
duced fixed estimates for the elasticity of substitution. We employ a time-
varying state-space technique to estimate the evolution of the elasticity. We
find that the elasticity of substitution has been fluctuating slightly above
unity since 1980.
1.3 Outline
In the following section we present a simple Solow model with a representative
firm that owns the capital and is controlled by the capitalist agents in the
economy. The heterogenous agents differ from the original model mainly
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in that they are not agnostic between capital and wage income. The more
capital, or share of the firm, agents have the more they care about capital
income. Since the capitalists control the representative firm they employ
technical change in service of capital income growth.
In the third section we address the first contention regarding capital deep-
ening by analyzing the dynamic behavior of the economy under different
elasticity of substitution cases. In the fourth section we address the second
contention regarding the elasticity of substitution using a time-varying state-
space technique to estimate the evolution of elasticity. We conclude in the
fifth section.
2 Model
We begin with a Solow model of the economy but we do not assume that cap-
ital is divided homogeneously between the agents in the economy. Instead,
individual agents may be thought of as workers with random degrees of cap-
ital. This structure accommodates a continuum of classes rather than just
one or two classes (O’connell 1995). We term agents whose capital income is
larger than their wage income “capitalists”. All the capital in the economy
is invested in a representative firm, which is controlled by the capitalists.
Capitalists may divide their wealth between bonds and stocks but bonds,
in this closed economy, sum to zero in aggregate. Hence, capital’s share of
income equals:
pi = F (TK,EL)−W · L
where pi is capital income, K capital, T capital augmenting technology, L
labor, E labor augmenting education, andW the wage. Education and labor
are evolving exogenously while capital and production are endogenous.
We assume that markets are competitive and that the aggregate produc-
tion function is concave with constant returns to scale in both capital and
labor. From profit maximization, labor earns its marginal product W = ∂F
∂L
and using Euler’s rule, capital’s share of income equals:
pi =
∂F
∂K
·K + ∂F
∂L
· L−W · L = ∂F
∂K
·K (1)
In this model the firm earns the marginal product of capital. This structure
solves an age-old conundrum that “If all inputs were paid their value marginal
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product, the firm would suffer losses” (Romer 1989 attributing to Schumpeter
1942).
As in the original Solow model the saving rate s and depreciation rate δ
are determined exogenously. The capital law of motion is therefore:
K˙ = sF (TK,EL)− δK
Capital per effective worker also remains as in the original Solow model:
k =
K
EL
Accordingly, output per worker is:
f(Tk) =
F (TK,EL)
EL
= F (Tk, 1)
The important change from the Solow model is that neither the agents
nor the firm are agnostic between wage and capital income. In the Solow
model both factors earn their marginal product and the firm’s profit is zero.
Here, the more capital agents have, the stronger their interest in capital
income over wage income. Moreover, capitalists control the representative
firm, which earns the marginal product of its capital and therefore it employs
technology with the sole purpose of growing capital income.
2.1 Technical Change
Capital with increased marginal productivity becomes available exogenously
but its deployment is determined endogenously and requires investment that
converts capital with lower marginal productivity to capital with higher
marginal productivity. Capital with higher marginal productivity costs more
than unity in terms of the lower marginal productivity capital. As a result,
when the firm invests in new technology, it suffers a reduction in the amount
of capital (Greenwood et. al 1997).
The firm deploys capital with higher marginal productivity only when
capital income is increased as a result, which occurs when the increase in
marginal productivity is higher than the decrease in capital: pi′ = ∂F ′
∂K
·K ′ >
∂F
∂K
·K.
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2.2 Inequality
Inequality θ is defined as the ratio of profit per worker, to wage (Ricardo
1891):
θ =
pi/L
W
This definition of income inequality focuses on the disparity between wealth
derived income and wage derived income. It does not make any assumptions
regarding the concentration of wealth. Under the assumption of competi-
tive markets both capital and labor earn their marginal product. Therefore,
inequality in the model takes the form of capital to labor income ratio:
θ =
∂F
∂K
·K/L
∂F
∂L
=
∂F
∂K
·K
∂F
∂L
· L (2)
3 Capital Deepening
Since the representative firm earns the marginal product of its capital, it
employs technology with the sole purpose of growing capital income. In
order to understand how technical change may be used for increasing capital
income we consider three cases of a CES production function starting with
the simple case of elasticity of substitution σ close to unity (Cobb-Douglas),
then with elasticity larger than unity σ > 1 and finally with elasticity lower
than unity 0 < σ < 1.
3.1 Cobb-Douglass σ = 1
Consider the simple case of output when the elasticity of substitution equal
to unity (Cobb-Douglas):
Y = (TK)α(EL)1−α = (Tk)αEL
Capital income is: pi = ∂F
∂K
·K = αY = α(Tk)αE¯L, which may be increased
by an increase in capital intensity α, technology augmentation T or both,
through capital conversion, taking augmented labor EL as given. Capital
conversion that increases ∂F
∂K
reduces total capital K and capital per worker
k.
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It is straight forward to see that capital income is increasing in capital
augmentation T . For an increase in the intensity of capital α to have a
positive effect on capital income the condition is a positive derivative:
∂pi
∂α
= Y + αY ln(Tk) = Y (1 + α lnTk) > 0
(Tk)α > e−1 (3)
As long as output per worker y = (Tk)α is above 1/e, an increase in capital
intensity α has a positive effect on capital income. An increase in capital
augmentation T is therefore synergetic with an increase in capital intensity
α since it makes the condition (3) less binding. On the other hand, inequality
sharply increases in capital intensity:
θ =
α
(1− α)
Increases in both capital intensity α and technology augmentation T af-
fect output per worker and capital income. Such technical change requires
investment in new technology through capital conversion. The investment
reduces capital per worker k leading to a change in the dynamics of the model
and to a new steady state. Using the capital law of motion K˙ = sY − δK,
capital per worker k = K/EL and the log derivation procedure while assign-
ing corresponding growth rate terms for education and labor yields:
k˙
k
=
K˙
K
− E˙
E
− L˙
L
=
sY
K
− δ − gE − gL
k˙ = sy − k(gE + gL + δ)
The steady state k˙ = 0 requires:
sy = k(gE + gL + δ) (4)
sTαkα = k(gE + gL + δ)
with a steady state capital per worker:
kss =
(
sTα
gE + gL + δ
) 1
1−α
(5)
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The following diagram depicts the effect of technical change on the dy-
namics of the economy beginning from the steady state before the change
marked “A”. As a result of investment in new technology via capital conver-
sion, the economy transitions to a higher production curve but lower capital
per worker marked “B”, which is not a steady state. If the saving rate is
unchanged s = s′, the economy ends up in a new steady state marked “C”
where capital per worker is larger than before the change k′∗ > k∗, meaning
that technical change does result in capital deepening.
Elsby et al. define the income share of labor to be λ = 1 − α(k) where
α(k) = f
′(k)k
f(k)
. They conclude that because the income share of labor in the
Cobb-Douglas case λ = 1 − αkα
kα
= 1 − α does not depend on k, there is no
capital deepening that is implied by a decrease in the labor share. However,
when the dynamics of the economy are taken into consideration, an increase
in either T or α does result in capital deepening unless the saving rate s
falls or, alternatively, that depreciation rate δ, labor force growth rate gL, or
education growth rate gE increase. Parker (2000) shows evidence that the
saving rate indeed dropped during the decline in labor share of income.
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Source: Parker (2000)
The above analysis settles the first contention regarding capital deepen-
ing in the Cobb-Douglas case. First, the incentive for technical change that
increases inequality is clearly demonstrated when the firm earns capital in-
come. Second, the decline in saving rate provides a plausible explanation for
a decreased labor share of income without capital deepening. Third, the con-
cern of Elsby et al. regarding the temporal misalignment of capital deepening
with the decrease in labor share is explained by the initial investment in new
technology through capital conversion that temporarily reduces capital per
worker.
3.2 Gross Substitution σ > 1
Next consider the CES production function with elasticity larger than unity
in line with Karabarbounis and Neiman’s estimate of σ = 1.25. The produc-
tion function is: Y = [α(TK)r + (1−α)(EL)r]1/r where r = σ−1
σ
, and capital
income is: pi = ∂F
∂K
· K = α(TK)rY 1−r. Capital income is increasing in α
under the following condition:
∂pi
∂α
= (TK)rY 1−r + α(TK)r(
1− r
r
)Y 1−2r[(TK)r − (EL)r] > 0
(TK)rY 1−2r{Y r + α(1− r
r
)[(TK)r − (EL)r]} > 0
α(TK)r(1 +
1− r
r
) + (EL)r − α(EL)r(1 + 1− r
r
) > 0
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α
r
(TK)r + (EL)r >
α
r
(EL)r
(Tk)r > 1− r
α
(Tk)r > 1− r
α
(6)
When the elasticity σ is larger than unity, then 0 < r < 1 and the expression
on the right hand side of the inequality is close to zero or negative. Con-
sequently, we conclude that an increase in capital intensity α has a positive
effect on capital income. An increase in capital augmenting technology T in-
creases both output and capital income. Similar to the Cobb-Douglas case,
an increase in the marginal product of capital through increases in α, T or
both would require an investment, which reduces capital K and capital per
worker k. As a result, the economy’s dynamics shift to a new steady state
that requires:
sy = s[α(Tk)r + (1− α)]1/r = k(gE + gL + δ)
which leads to a new capital per worker steady state:
kss = s
(
1− α
(gE + gL + δ)r − αsrT r
) 1
r
(7)
In order to find out whether an increase in α results in capital deepening we
check if:
∂kss
∂α
> 0
s
r
(
1− α
(gE + gL + δ)r − αsrT r
) 1
r
−1(−(gE + gL + δ)r + αsrT r + (1− α)srT r
[(gE + gL + δ)r − αsrT r]2
)
> 0
Since r > 0 this condition requires that:
(gE + gL + δ)
r > αsrT r
⋂
srT r > (gE + gL + δ)
r
which is satisfied when:
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srT r > (gE + gL + δ)
r > αsrT r (8)
Similarly, the steady state capital per worker kss increases in T under the
following conditions:
∂kss
∂T
> 0
s
r
(
1− α
(gE + gL + δ)r − αsrT r
) 1
r
−1(
(1− α)rαsrT r−1
[(gE + gL + δ)r − αsrT r]2
)
> 0
which is satisfied when:
(gE + gL + δ)
r > αsrT r (9)
Contrary to Elsby et al., a decrease in the labor share through increases in
α, T or both would lead to capital deepening in steady state only under the
above strict conditions (8) and (9) that may be violated by a high enough
increases in α and T themselves as well as changes to the savings, depreciation
or growth rates. On the other hand, inequality increases more sharply than
in the Cobb-Douglass case due to increases in both capital augmentation T ,
and capital intensity α even without capital deepening:
θ =
α(TK)rY 1−r
(1− α)(EL)rY 1−r =
α(Tk)r
(1− α)
The above analysis settles the first contention regarding capital deepening
in the gross substitution case. A decline in saving rate provides one plausible
explanation for a decreased labor share without capital deepening. It is less
clear whether there would be capital deepening to begin with, in the gross
substitution case, due to strict conditions (8, 9) for capital deepening as
a result of increases in α and T . On the other hand, the effects of these
increases on capital share of income and inequality are stronger than in the
Cobb-Douglas case.
3.3 Gross Complementarity 0 < σ < 1
For elasticity between zero and unity 0 < σ < 1, r < 0 and therefore inequal-
ity and capital share of income is increasing in α and decreasing in both T
and k:
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θ =
α(Tk)r
1− α (10)
Therefore, an increase in T is counterfactual and we rule it out since it reduces
the capital share of income. The condition for a positive effect of an increase
in α on capital income from (6) when r < 0 becomes:
(Tk)r < 1− r
α
(11)
Since the right hand side is larger than unity, this condition is satisfied when
Tk > 1. When (12) holds, an increase in α is pursued by the firm leading to
capital deepening when:
∂kss
∂α
> 0
s
r
(
1− α
(gE + gL + δ)r − αsrT r
) 1
r
−1(−(gE + gL + δ)r + αsrT r + (1− α)srT r
[(gE + gL + δ)r − αsrT r]2
)
> 0
Since r < 0 this condition requires that:
(gE + gL + δ)
r > αsrT r
⋂
srT r < (gE + gL + δ)
r
or
(gE + gL + δ)
r < αsrT r
⋂
srT r > (gE + gL + δ)
r
which are satisfied when:
(gE + gL + δ)
r > srT r > αsrT r (12)
or
(gE + gL + δ)
r < αsrT r < srT r (13)
Conditions (13) or (14) may well be met. Therefore, contrary to Elsby et
al., an increase in α may well lead to capital deepening in steady state under
gross complementarity. However, capital deepening would in turn reduce the
capital share of income, which is counterfactual. Therefore, the decrease in
labor share is less consistent with gross complementarity in the production
function.
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3.4 Summary
We note in passing that the choice by Elsby et al. of k = TK
EL
may result in
disagreement with any measure of capital per worker that does not include
capital augmentation. In addition, we have shown how considering initial
capital investment in new technology may ease Elsby et al. concern over
temporal misalignment between the declines in the labor share of income
and capital deepening. We have shown how considering the dynamics of the
economy solves the first contention regarding capital deepening through the
reduction in the saving rate, which mitigates the effect of technical change
on capital deepening. Finally, we have shown that a decrease in the labor
share of income is less consistent with elasticity of substitution below unity.
4 Elasticity of Substitution
Most estimates of the elasticity of substitution in the economy under a CES
production function are between 0.551 to 0.948 (Antras 2004) as opposed to
Karabarbounis and Neiman’s (2013) estimate of 1.25. The consequences of
this contention go well beyond inequality and the decrease in the income share
of labor. This contention relates to the feasibility of capital augmentation
(Acemoglu 2003) and to the feasibility of balanced growth in the face of
capital augmentation (Uzawa 1965, Grossman et al. 2017). Berndt (1976) as
well as Chirinko (2008) show that estimates of the elasticity of substitution
vary based on the estimation procedure, data processing and functional form
estimated.
We hypothesize that the elasticity of substitution is an evolving parameter
of a changing production technology, especially in light of the increase in the
degree of automation and the disappearance of routine jobs (Orak 2017).
Since previous elasticity estimates were derived by linear regression, they
produced fixed estimates. We employ a time-varying state-space estimation
technique to estimate the evolution of the elasticity of substitution. We begin
from the equality of unadjusted marginal productivity of labor and wage :
∂F
∂L
= Y 1−r(1− α)ErLr−1 = W
Taking logs and adding time subscripts we get the following observation
equation:
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(1− rt) lnYt + ln(1− αt) + rt lnEt + (rt − 1) lnLt = lnWt
and letting: yt = lnYt − lnLt, wt = lnWt, σt = 11−rt , which is the elastic-
ity of substitution, and ct = σt[ln(1 − αt) + rt lnEt], produces a simplified
observation equation:
yt = σtwt − ct + t (14)
Where the dependent variable yt is log GDP per hour, the independent vari-
able wt is the log wage per hour and the slope σt is the elasticity of substi-
tution. The relationship between the variables appears to be linear:
For a time-varying estimation we put the observation equation in a time
varying regression form: yt = x′tβt + t where xt =
[
wt
−1
]
and βt =
[
σt
ct
]
.
The time varying parameters βt are assumed to evolve around their mean β¯
according to a Markov process with Gaussian noise: βt+1−β¯ = F (βt−β¯)+νt.
We define the state variable to be: st = βt − β¯, which evolves according to
the state equation:
st+1 = Fst + νt (15)
Accordingly, the observation equation becomes:
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yt = x
′
tβ¯ + x
′
tst + t (16)
We use annual data on output (GDP), hours worked, and wages (FRED 2017)
for the sample period (1948-2015). In order to estimate β¯ we use an OLS
regression of the model yt = σwt−c+t, which yields an elasticity estimate of
1.0505 with log-likelihood 167. Applying the Kalman Filter (Hamilton 1994)
to the data, we maximize the likelihood of the model by optimizing the
parameters F, V ar(νt), V ar(t). We report below the results of the Kalman
Filter and Kalman Smoother algorithms for the time-varying estimation of
the elasticity of substitution σt with log likelihood 1,144 (Matlab code is
provided in appendix 2):
The estimated trajectory is sensitive to the choice of β¯ until 1980 from
which point it fluctuates at only slightly above unity and close to the OLS
estimate. We did not find an increasing trend that we expected to find based
on the increase in automation. Our finding that the elasticity of substitu-
tion is slightly above unity is consistent with our theoretical findings of the
conditions for a decrease in the labor share of income.
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5 Conclusions
We have clearly demonstrated the incentive for technical change that in-
creases inequality when the capitalists control the representative firm, which
earns capital income. We have shown how considering initial capital in-
vestment in new technology may ease Elsby et al. concern over temporal
misalignment between the declines in the labor share of income and capital
deepening. We have shown how considering the dynamics of the economy
solves the contention regarding capital deepening through the reduction in
the saving rate, which mitigates the effect of technical change on capital
deepening. Finally, we have shown that a decrease in the labor share of
income is less consistent with elasticity of substitution below unity.
We have addressed the second contention regarding whether the elasticity
of substitution is above or below unity by performing a time-varying state-
space estimation of the evolution of elasticity over time using the unadjusted
marginal product of labor. We have shown that production elasticity be-
tween capital and labor has been fluctuating at slightly above unity since
1980, which is consistent with our theoretical findings of the conditions for
a decrease in the labor share of income. However, an elasticity of substi-
tution above or equal to unity is not consistent with theories that exclude
capital augmentation (Acemoglu 2003) or that explain balanced growth un-
der capital augmentation assuming gross complementarity (Grossman et al.
2017).
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